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O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal

The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Office 365 Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It leverages `o365_management_activity` logs, specifically…

Description

The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Office 365 Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It leverages `o365_management_activity` logs, specifically focusing on the 'Add app role assignment to service principal' operation. This activity is significant for SOCs as it may indicate a bypass of critical administrative controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to misuse automated processes to assign sensitive permissions, compromising the security of the environment.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.

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