O365 Service Principal Privilege Escalation
This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding themself to a new app role assignment.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_to_user
Known benign triggers
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/mvelazc0/BadZure | 2 |
| posts.specterops.io/microsoft-breach-what-happened-what-should-azure-admins-do-da2b7e674ebc | 2 |
| splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4055 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-m365-invaders-navigating-the-shadows-of-midnight-blizzard.html | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- b686d0bd-cca7-44ca-ae07-87f6465131d9
- Tagged by the source as
- Azure Active Directory Privilege EscalationOffice 365 Account TakeoverAzure TenantcloudSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityidentity
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1