Detect mshta renamed
The following analytic identifies instances where mshta.exe has been renamed and executed. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original file name field to detect…
Description
The following analytic identifies instances where mshta.exe has been renamed and executed. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original file name field to detect discrepancies. This activity is significant because renaming mshta.exe is a common tactic used by attackers to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses | 6 |
| redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ | 7 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
- Tagged by the source as
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealerLiving Off The LandSuspicious MSHTA ActivityEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 6, 2026
- Version
- 2