Linux Dirty Frag Kernel Privilege Escalation
The following analytic detects exploitation of Dirty Frag (CVE-2026-43284 and CVE-2026-43500), a Linux kernel local privilege escalation vulnerability. The exploit corrupts the kernel page cache via the IPsec ESP or…
Description
The following analytic detects exploitation of Dirty Frag (CVE-2026-43284 and CVE-2026-43500), a Linux kernel local privilege escalation vulnerability. The exploit corrupts the kernel page cache via the IPsec ESP or RxRPC subsystems using a high-frequency splice() syscall loop, followed by a privilege transition to root in the same audit session. This analytic anchors on the exploit-specific behavioral signature, a sustained splice() spray (50 or more calls within a 60-second window) from an unprivileged process executing from a user-writable path (/home, /tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp, /run/user, /root), followed within 5 minutes by execution of a set-uid binary in the same auditd session.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- linux_auditd_syscall
Known benign triggers
- The splice volume threshold (50 calls per 60 seconds from a single process in a user-writable path) is calibrated against the V4bel public PoC, which produces 100-460 splice calls in 90 seconds depending on system state. Legitimate user-mode workloads that may produce splice() calls (web servers, mail transfer agents, language runtimes) typically execute from system paths (/usr/sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/lib) and are excluded by the user-writable path filter. Custom-compiled applications, developer test binaries, or container runtimes executing from /home or /tmp could theoretically reach the volume threshold during legitimate I/O-heavy workloads (large file copies, log rotation, archive operations). Operators should baseline splice volume in their environment before enabling as a notable event. If false positives occur, add an allowlist of trusted binary paths via the linux_dirty_frag_kernel_privilege_escalation_filter macro, or raise the splice_count threshold based on observed legitimate-workload baseline.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/ | 6from 2 sources |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/ | 3from 2 sources |
| github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag | Only this detection cites it |
| www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-31431 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-43284 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-43500 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/08/active-attack-dirty-frag-linux-vulnerability-expands-post-compromise-risk/ | Only this detection cites it |
| www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/07/8 | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 517e7bf8-d0aa-46ac-80e1-f9f498944b71
- Tagged by the source as
- Linux Privilege EscalationEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1