Back to results

MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages

The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity…

Description

The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity by monitoring the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process, which typically does not write .aspx files. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an active exploitation attempt on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further compromise.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.

Detections can measure how the public catalogue is used — which detections people look for, and which pages bring them here. It sets a cookie that recognises this browser for 180 days. It is never linked to an account and never follows you to other sites. Privacy notice