Rundll32 Shimcache Flush
The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious rundll32 command line used to clear the shim cache. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs…
Description
The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious rundll32 command line used to clear the shim cache. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because clearing the shim cache is an anti-forensic technique aimed at evading detection and removing forensic artifacts. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts, allowing an attacker to cover their tracks and maintain persistence on the compromised machine.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122
- Tagged by the source as
- Compromised Windows HostLiving Off The LandUnusual ProcessesEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1