Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD
The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe when invoked with create or delete flags, specifically focusing on those executions where the process includes additional…
Description
The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe when invoked with create or delete flags, specifically focusing on those executions where the process includes additional parameters such as /tr, /sc, or /ru. The detection uses Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, and filters out events originating from trusted system paths like C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Program Files. It further narrows results to cases where schtasks.exe is launched by potentially suspicious parent processes such as cmd.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe, and excludes service accounts. This behavior may indicate adversary efforts to gain persistence or evade detection by manipulating scheduled tasks using scripts or command shells. If confirmed malicious, such activity could lead to unauthorized code execution or the removal of monitoring mechanisms on endpoints.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- While it is possible for legitimate scripts or administrators to trigger this behavior, filtering can be applied based on the parent process and application to reduce false positives. Analysts should reference the provided references to understand the context and threat landscape associated with this activity.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml#L21 | 4 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-create | 4from 2 sources |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-delete | 2from 2 sources |
| thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/ | 8from 2 sources |
| www.joesandbox.com/analysis/691823/0/html | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c
- Tagged by the source as
- 0bj3ctivity StealerAgentTeslaAmadeyAPT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealerAsyncRATAzorultChina-Nexus Threat ActivityCISA AA22-257ACISA AA23-347ACISA AA24-241ADarkCrystal RATDHS Report TA18-074ALiving Off The LandLokibotMedusa RansomwareMoonPeakNetSupport RMM Tool AbuseNjRATNOBELIUM GroupPhemedrone StealerPlugXPrestige RansomwareQakbotQuasar RATRedLine StealerRemcosRhysida RansomwareSalt TyphoonSandworm ToolsScattered SpiderScheduled TasksShrinkLockerSolarWinds WHD RCE Post ExploitationTrickbotValleyRATWindows Persistence TechniquesWinter VivernXWormEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 13, 2026
- Version
- 2