Back to results

Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition

The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects across different domains. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory…

Description

The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects across different domains. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute allows users to inherit permissions from other AD accounts, which can be exploited by adversaries for inter-domain privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to resources, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges across domain boundaries.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
Windows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • Domain mergers and migrations may generate large volumes of false positives for this analytic.

Detections can measure how the public catalogue is used — which detections people look for, and which pages bring them here. It sets a cookie that recognises this browser for 180 days. It is never linked to an account and never follows you to other sites. Privacy notice