Windows AD Domain Root ACL Modification
ACL modification performed on the domain root object, significant AD change with high impact. Following MS guidance all changes at this level should be reviewed. Drill into the logonID within EventCode 4624 for…
Description
ACL modification performed on the domain root object, significant AD change with high impact. Following MS guidance all changes at this level should be reviewed. Drill into the logonID within EventCode 4624 for information on the source device during triage.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Identity ProviderWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- windows_event_log_security_5136
Known benign triggers
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory | 15 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/1522b774-6464-41a3-87a5-1e5633c3fbbb | 6 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/ace-strings | 5 |
| trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a | 7 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4981e2db-1372-440d-816e-3e7e2ed74433
- Tagged by the source as
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence TricksEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 6, 2026
- Version
- 2