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Windows Application Whitelisting Bypass Attempt via Rundll32

The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe calling one of the following DLLs: - Advpack.dll - Ieadvpack.dll - Syssetup.dll - Setupapi.dll with one of the following functions: "LaunchINFSection",…

Description

The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe calling one of the following DLLs: - Advpack.dll - Ieadvpack.dll - Syssetup.dll - Setupapi.dll with one of the following functions: "LaunchINFSection", "InstallHinfSection", "SetupInfObjectInstallAction". This method is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control or whitelisting bypass, allowing script code execution from a file. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further network compromise. Investigate the script content, network connections, and any spawned child processes for further context.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
Windows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may leverage one of the following DLLs syssetup.dll, dvpack.dll, ieadvpack.dll and can trigger a false positive. Apply additional filters as needed.

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