Windows Audit Policy Disabled via Legacy Auditpol
The following analytic identifies the execution of the legacy `auditpol.exe` included with the Windows 2000 Resource Kit Tools, with the "/disable" command-line argument or one of the allowed category flags and the…
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of the legacy `auditpol.exe` included with the Windows 2000 Resource Kit Tools, with the "/disable" command-line argument or one of the allowed category flags and the "none" option, in order to disable a specific logging category from the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- False positives should be rare, investigate the activity, and apply additional filters when necessary.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/ | 7 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol-set | 6 |
| www.cybereason.com/blog/research/prometei-botnet-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities | 5 |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ | 6 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d2cef287-c2b7-4496-a609-7a548c1e27f9
- Tagged by the source as
- Windows Audit Policy TamperingEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1