Windows Audit Policy Restored via Auditpol
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/restore" command-line argument used to restore the audit policy from a file. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)…
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/restore" command-line argument used to restore the audit policy from a file. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Attackers can provide an audit policy file that disables certain or all audit policy configuration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- False positives could arise from administrative activity such as audit policy setup. Apply additional filters to known scripts and parent processes performing this action where necessary.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/ | 7 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol-restore | Only this detection cites it |
| www.cybereason.com/blog/research/prometei-botnet-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities | 5 |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ | 6 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d7d1795b-ea18-47e5-9ca6-2c330d052d21
- Tagged by the source as
- Windows Audit Policy TamperingEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1