Windows Bluetooth Service Installed From Uncommon Location
Identifies the creation of a Windows service named "BluetoothService" with a binary path in user-writable directories, particularly %AppData%\Bluetooth. This technique was observed in the Lotus Blossom Chrysalis…
Description
Identifies the creation of a Windows service named "BluetoothService" with a binary path in user-writable directories, particularly %AppData%\Bluetooth. This technique was observed in the Lotus Blossom Chrysalis backdoor campaign, where attackers created a service named "BluetoothService" pointing to a malicious binary (renamed Bitdefender Submission Wizard) in a hidden AppData directory. While legitimate Bluetooth services exist in Windows, they are system services with binaries in System32. Any BluetoothService created with a binary path in user directories (AppData, Temp, Downloads) is highly suspicious and indicates potential malware persistence.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- windows_event_log_system_7045
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate Bluetooth services in Windows are system services located in System32. Any BluetoothService created outside of system directories is highly suspicious. However, false positives may occur if: 1. Third-party Bluetooth software installs services in Program Files (excluded by this detection) 2. Development or testing environments create test services The detection specifically targets user-writable directories (AppData, Temp) which are strong indicators of malicious activity. Allowlist known-good third-party Bluetooth software installation paths if needed.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/ | 7 |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/ | 10 |
| www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/ | 7from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f12b81e6-2fa2-48e0-95cd-f5f7e4d9ac89
- Tagged by the source as
- Lotus Blossom Chrysalis BackdoorEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1