Windows BootLoader Inventory
The following analytic identifies the bootloader paths on Windows endpoints. It leverages a PowerShell Scripted input to capture this data, which is then processed and aggregated using Splunk. Monitoring bootloader…
Description
The following analytic identifies the bootloader paths on Windows endpoints. It leverages a PowerShell Scripted input to capture this data, which is then processed and aggregated using Splunk. Monitoring bootloader paths is significant for a SOC as it helps detect unauthorized modifications that could indicate bootkits or other persistent threats. If confirmed malicious, such activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, bypass security controls, and potentially control the boot process, leading to full system compromise.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Network DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- No false positives here, only bootloaders. Filter as needed or create a lookup as a baseline.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| gist.github.com/MHaggis/26518cd2844b0e03de6126660bb45707 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/ | 8from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4f7e3913-4db3-4ccd-afe4-31198982305d
- Tagged by the source as
- BlackLotus CampaignWindows BootKitsEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1