Windows CAB File on Disk
The following analytic detects .cab files being written to disk. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on events where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'. This…
Description
The following analytic detects .cab files being written to disk. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on events where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'. This activity can be significant as .cab files can be used to deliver malicious payloads, including embedded .url files that execute harmful code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise. Analysts should review the file path and associated artifacts for further investigation.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- sysmon_eventid_11
Known benign triggers
- Some false positives are expected from user controlled folders.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2023-10-25-IOCs-from-DarkGate-activity.txt | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 622f08d0-69ef-42c2-8139-66088bc25acd
- Tagged by the source as
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealerDarkGate MalwareEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Sep 7, 2026
- Version
- 2