Windows Cabinet File Extraction Via Expand
Detects usage of expand.exe to extract Microsoft Cabinet (CAB) archives, with emphasis on extractions into `C:\\ProgramData` or similar staging locations. In recent APT37 activity, a CAB payload (e.g., wonder.cab)…
Description
Detects usage of expand.exe to extract Microsoft Cabinet (CAB) archives, with emphasis on extractions into `C:\\ProgramData` or similar staging locations. In recent APT37 activity, a CAB payload (e.g., wonder.cab) was expanded into ProgramData prior to persistence and execution. This behavior is a strong signal for ingress tool transfer and staging of payloads.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate software deployment or administrators may use expand.exe for local file extraction. Filter by approved deployment tools, signed parent processes, and sanctioned paths.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml#L304 | 3 |
| www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt37-targets-windows-rust-backdoor-and-python-loader | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4e3e3b8c-6d3a-4b47-9f5a-9e3e0a0a6f2f
- Tagged by the source as
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealerNetSupport RMM Tool AbuseEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 13, 2026
- Version
- 2