Windows Certutil Root Certificate Addition
The following analytic detects the use of certutil.exe to add a certificate to the Root certificate store using the "-addstore" flag. In this case, the certificate is loaded from a temporary file path (e.g., %TEMP%)…
Description
The following analytic detects the use of certutil.exe to add a certificate to the Root certificate store using the "-addstore" flag. In this case, the certificate is loaded from a temporary file path (e.g., %TEMP%) or other uncommon locations (e.g. C:\\Users\\Public\\), which is highly suspicious and uncommon in legitimate administrative activity. This behavior may indicate an adversary is installing a malicious root certificate to intercept HTTPS traffic, impersonate trusted entities, or bypass security controls. The use of flags such as -f (force) and -Enterprise, combined with loading .tmp files from user-writable locations, is consistent with post-exploitation activity seen in credential theft and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks. This should be investigated immediately, especially if correlated with unauthorized privilege use or prior certificate modifications. You should monitor when new certificates are added to the root store because this store is what your system uses to decide which websites, apps, and software can be trusted. If an attacker manages to add their own certificate there, they can silently intercept encrypted traffic, impersonate trusted websites, or make malicious programs look safe. This means they could steal sensitive data, bypass security tools, and keep access to your system even after other malware is removed.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- PRE
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- Administrators or third party utilities may use leverage certutil in order to add a root certificate to the store. Filter as needed or restrict to critical assets on the perimeter.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
1 exclusive technique.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/retefe-banking-trojan-targets-sweden-switzerland-and-japan/ | Only this detection cites it |
| www.deepinstinct.com/blog/iranian-threat-actor-continues-to-develop-mass-exploitation-tools | Only this detection cites it |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/07/31/frozen-in-transit-secret-blizzards-aitm-campaign-against-diplomats/ | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e9926391-ec0c-4bad-8a95-e450dbf6aae4
- Tagged by the source as
- Secret BlizzardEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1