Windows ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor Execution Via PowerShell Script
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging. The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for…
Description
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging. The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments. This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain. When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process. This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant. Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 4 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- powershell_script_block_logging_4104
Known benign triggers
- Certain administrative or security testing activities in Azure AD environments may use ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor for legitimate federation configuration changes. Review and allow such actions from trusted administrators and approved tools.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| atomicredteam.io/privilege-escalation/T1484.002/#atomic-test-1---add-federation-to-azure-ad | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1484.002/T1484.002.yaml#L5 | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 59a8662f-f616-4494-8fa1-29ae77fc2018
- Tagged by the source as
- Azure Active Directory Account TakeoverAzure Active Directory PersistenceAzure Active Directory Privilege EscalationEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 13, 2026
- Version
- 2