Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator
The following analytic identifies potential Kerberos ticket forging attacks, specifically the Diamond Ticket attack. This is detected when a user logs into a host and the GroupMembership field in event 4627 indicates…
Description
The following analytic identifies potential Kerberos ticket forging attacks, specifically the Diamond Ticket attack. This is detected when a user logs into a host and the GroupMembership field in event 4627 indicates a privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins), but the user does not actually belong to that group in the directory service. The detection leverages Windows Security Event Log 4627, which logs account logon events. The analytic cross-references the GroupMembership field from the event against a pre-populated lookup of actual group memberships. Its crucial to note that the accuracy and effectiveness of this detection heavily rely on the users diligence in populating and regularly updating this lookup table. Any discrepancies between the events GroupMembership and the lookup indicate potential ticket forging. Kerberos ticket forging, especially the Diamond Ticket attack, allows attackers to impersonate any user and potentially gain unauthorized access to resources. By forging a ticket that indicates membership in a privileged group, an attacker can bypass security controls and gain elevated privileges. Detecting such discrepancies in group memberships during logon events can be a strong indicator of this attack in progress, making it crucial for security teams to monitor and investigate. If validated as a true positive, this indicates that an attacker has successfully forged a Kerberos ticket and may have gained unauthorized access to critical resources, potentially with elevated privileges.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- windows_event_log_security_4627
Known benign triggers
- False positives may trigger the detections certain scenarios like directory service delays or out of date lookups. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus/pull/136 | Only this detection cites it |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4627 | Only this detection cites it |
| trustedsec.com/blog/a-diamond-in-the-ruff | Only this detection cites it |
| unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/next-gen-kerberos-attacks | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 10381f93-6d38-470a-9c30-d25478e3bd3f
- Tagged by the source as
- Active Directory Kerberos AttacksActive Directory Privilege EscalationCompromised Windows HostGozi MalwareEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 6, 2026
- Version
- 2