Windows Excel Spawning Microsoft Project Application
The following analytic identifies the execution of uncommon Microsoft application executables as child processes of Microsoft Excel. Under normal conditions, Excel primarily spawns internal Office-related processes,…
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of uncommon Microsoft application executables as child processes of Microsoft Excel. Under normal conditions, Excel primarily spawns internal Office-related processes, and the creation of executables such as WINPROJ.EXE, FOXPROW.exe, or SCHDPLUS.exe is uncommon in typical business workflows. Adversaries may abuse this behavior to blend malicious activity within trusted applications, execute unauthorized code, or bypass application control mechanisms. This technique aligns with common tradecraft where Office applications are leveraged as initial access or execution vectors due to their prevalence in enterprise environments. Detecting this relationship helps defenders spot suspicious child processes that may indicate malware execution, persistence mechanisms, or attempts to establish command-and-control. Security teams should investigate the parent Excel process, the context of the ActivateMicrosoftApp() execution, and any subsequent network or file activity. While certain legitimate Office features could trigger this process in specific environments, its occurrence generally warrants further scrutiny to validate intent and rule out compromise.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- Microsoft Project has been discontinued since January 2010, so its presence is unlikely in modern environments. If a related child process is observed, verify its legitimacy to rule out potential misuse.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.talosintelligence.com/pathwiper-targets-ukraine/ | Only this detection cites it |
| specterops.io/blog/2023/10/30/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application/ | Only this detection cites it |
| www.trellix.com/blogs/research/dcom-abuse-and-network-erasure-with-trellix-ndr/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- ee54241e-0815-4423-9729-e1f5dfc402de
- Tagged by the source as
- PathWiperEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1