Windows Handle Duplication in Known UAC-Bypass Binaries
The following analytic detects duplicate-handle access to known UAC-bypass binaries from a non-standard source path. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for…
Description
The following analytic detects duplicate-handle access to known UAC-bypass binaries from a non-standard source path. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- sysmon_eventid_10
Known benign triggers
- It is possible legitimate applications will request access to list of know abused Windows UAC binaries process, filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.recordedfuture.com/research/from-castleloader-to-castlerat-tag-150-advances-operations | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d7369bf5-1315-4138-b927-2dd8bb8c1da7
- Tagged by the source as
- Castle RATEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 22, 2026
- Version
- 2