Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry related to the Local Security Authority (LSA) NoLMHash setting. It identifies when the registry value is set to 0, indicating that the system will…
Description
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry related to the Local Security Authority (LSA) NoLMHash setting. It identifies when the registry value is set to 0, indicating that the system will store passwords in the weaker Lan Manager (LM) hash format. This detection leverages registry activity logs from endpoint data sources like Sysmon or EDR tools. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to weaken password storage security. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exploit weaker LM hashes, potentially leading to unauthorized access and credential theft.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- sysmon_eventid_13
Known benign triggers
- Administrator may change this registry setting.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a | 16from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 48cc1605-538c-4223-8382-e36bee5b540d
- Tagged by the source as
- CISA AA23-347AScattered Lapsus$ HuntersEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1