Windows RDPClient Connection Sequence Events
This analytic monitors Windows RDP client connection sequence events (EventCode 1024) from the Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational log. These events track when RDP ClientActiveX initiates…
Description
This analytic monitors Windows RDP client connection sequence events (EventCode 1024) from the Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational log. These events track when RDP ClientActiveX initiates connection attempts to remote servers. The connection sequence is a critical phase of RDP where the client and server exchange settings and establish common parameters for the session. Monitoring these events can help identify unusual RDP connection patterns, potential lateral movement attempts, unauthorized remote access activity, and RDP connection chains that may indicate compromised systems. NOTE the analytic was written for Multi-Line as XML was not properly parsed out.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- windows_event_log_microsoft_windows_terminalservices_rdpclient_1024
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate RDP connections from authorized administrators and users will generate these events. To reduce false positives, you should baseline normal RDP connection patterns in your environment, whitelist expected RDP connection chains between known administrative workstations and servers, and track authorized remote support sessions.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| gist.github.com/MHaggis/acd5dcbf1d4fb705b77f0a48e772eefc | Only this detection cites it |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/ | 4from 3 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 67340df1-3f1d-4470-93c8-9ac7249d11b0
- Tagged by the source as
- Spearphishing AttachmentsWindows RDP Artifacts and Defense EvasionEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1