Windows Service Create with Tscon
The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint…
Description
The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates an attacker may be trying to hijack a disconnected RDP session, posing a risk of unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over an existing user session, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- crowdstrike_processrollup2sysmon_eventid_1windows_event_log_security_4688
Known benign triggers
- False positives may arise in the RDP Hijacking analytic when legitimate administrators access remote sessions for maintenance or troubleshooting purposes. These activities might resemble an attacker''s attempt to hijack a disconnected session, leading to false alarms. To mitigate the risk of false positives and improve the overall security posture, organizations can implement Group Policy to automatically disconnect RDP sessions when they are complete. By enforcing this policy, administrators ensure that disconnected sessions are promptly terminated, reducing the window of opportunity for an attacker to hijack a session. Additionally, organizations can also implement access control mechanisms and monitor the behavior of privileged accounts to further enhance security and reduce the chances of false positives in RDP Hijacking detection.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| doublepulsar.com/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 | 2 |
| github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1563.002/T1563.002.yaml#L5 | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1563.002/T1563.002.md | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- c13b3d74-6b63-4db5-a841-4206f0370077
- Tagged by the source as
- Active Directory Lateral MovementCompromised Windows HostWindows RDP Artifacts and Defense EvasionEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 13, 2026
- Version
- 2