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Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication

The following analytic detects when a suspicious certificate with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) is issued using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and then immediately used for authentication. This…

Description

The following analytic detects when a suspicious certificate with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) is issued using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and then immediately used for authentication. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4887, to identify the issuance and subsequent use of the certificate. This activity is significant because improperly configured certificate templates can be exploited for privilege escalation and environment compromise. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and potentially compromise the entire environment.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • False positives may be generated in environments where administrative users or processes are allowed to generate certificates with Subject Alternative Names for authentication. Sources or templates used in these processes may need to be tuned out for accurate function.

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