Windows USBSTOR Registry Key Modification
This analytic is used to identify when a USB removable media device is attached to a Windows host. In this scenario we are querying the Endpoint Registry data model to look for modifications to the…
Description
This analytic is used to identify when a USB removable media device is attached to a Windows host. In this scenario we are querying the Endpoint Registry data model to look for modifications to the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\ key. Adversaries and Insider Threats may use removable media devices for several malicious activities, including initial access, execution, and exfiltration.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- sysmon_eventid_12sysmon_eventid_13
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200/ | 3 |
| www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-hackers-use-badusb-to-target-defense-firms-with-ransomware/ | 3 |
| www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/using-caution-usb-drives | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- a345980a-417d-4ed3-9fb4-cac30c9405a0
- Tagged by the source as
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealerData ProtectionEndpointendpointSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1