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HTTP Request to Reserved Name on IIS Server

Detects attempts to exploit a request smuggling technique against IIS that leverages a Windows quirk where requests for reserved Windows device names such as "/con" trigger an early server response before the request…

Description

Detects attempts to exploit a request smuggling technique against IIS that leverages a Windows quirk where requests for reserved Windows device names such as "/con" trigger an early server response before the request body is received. When combined with a Content-Length desynchronization, this behavior can lead to a parsing confusion between frontend and backend.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
suricata

Known benign triggers

  • False positives are not expected on IIS servers, as the detection is based on the presence of web requests to reserved names, which is not a common page to be accessed by legitimate users. Modify the query as needed to reduce false positives or hunt for additional indicators of compromise.

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