AWSCloudTrail - Failed Attempts to Change AWS CloudTrail Logs
Identifies FAILED or denied attempts to manipulate AWS CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, or VPC Flow Logs. Successful manipulation is covered by the higher-severity 'AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS…
Description
Identifies FAILED or denied attempts to manipulate AWS CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, or VPC Flow Logs. Successful manipulation is covered by the higher-severity 'AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs' rule. These failed attempts can indicate reconnaissance or an actor probing for insufficient permissions as part of defense evasion. For more information, visit: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html AWS CloudWatch/EventBridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html AWS DeleteFlowLogs API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source service
- awscloudtrail
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5
- Tagged by the source as
- DefenseEvasion
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Sep 4, 2026
- Version
- 2