AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs
Identifies successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction…
Description
Identifies successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction of incident visibility by an attacker.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source service
- awscloudtrail
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
- Tagged by the source as
- DefenseEvasion
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Sep 4, 2026
- Version
- 2