Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS New Server
This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health…
Description
This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-premises AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source product
- azureactivity
- Log source service
- azureactivity
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee
- Tagged by the source as
- DefenseEvasion
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Aug 29, 2026
- Version
- 1