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MediumMicrosoft Sentinel analytics

Hijack Execution Flow - DLL Side-Loading

This detection tries to identify all DLLs loaded by "high integrity" processes and cross-checks the DLL paths against FileCreate/FileModify events of the same DLL by a medium integrity process. Of course, we need to…

Description

This detection tries to identify all DLLs loaded by "high integrity" processes and cross-checks the DLL paths against FileCreate/FileModify events of the same DLL by a medium integrity process. Of course, we need to do some magic to filter out false positives as much as possible. So any FileCreate/FileModify done by "NT Authoriy\System" and the "RID 500" users aren't interesting. Also, we only want to see the FileCreate/FileModify actions which are performed with a default or limited token elevation. If done with a full elevated token, the user is apparently admin already.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform
Windows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Log source product
microsoftthreatprotection
Log source service
devicefileeventsdeviceimageloadevents

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