Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant
This rule looks for a service principal being granted the Microsoft Graph RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (application) permission before being used to add an Microsoft Entra ID object or user account to an Admin…
Description
This rule looks for a service principal being granted the Microsoft Graph RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (application) permission before being used to add an Microsoft Entra ID object or user account to an Admin directory role (i.e. Global Administrators). This is a known attack path that is usually abused when a service principal already has the AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All permission granted. This permission allows an app to manage permission grants for application permissions to any API. A service principal can promote itself or other service principals to admin roles (i.e. Global Administrators). This would be considered a privilege escalation technique. Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/graph/permissions-reference#role-management-permissions, https://docs.microsoft.com/graph/api/directoryrole-post-members?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source product
- azureactivedirectory
- Log source service
- auditlogs
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f80d951a-eddc-4171-b9d0-d616bb83efdc
- Tagged by the source as
- PersistencePrivilegeEscalation
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Sep 1, 2026
- Version
- 1