Password spray attack against Microsoft Entra ID application
Identifies evidence of password spray activity against Microsoft Entra ID applications by looking for failures from multiple accounts from the same IP address within a time window. If the number of accounts breaches…
Description
Identifies evidence of password spray activity against Microsoft Entra ID applications by looking for failures from multiple accounts from the same IP address within a time window. If the number of accounts breaches the threshold just once, all failures from the IP address within the time range are bought into the result. Details on whether there were successful authentications by the IP address within the time window are also included. This can be an indicator that an attack was successful. The default failure acccount threshold is 5, Default time window for failures is 20m and default look back window is 1 day Note: Due to the number of possible accounts involved in a password spray it is not possible to map identities to a custom entity. References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source product
- azureactivedirectory
- Log source service
- aadnoninteractiveusersigninlogssigninlogs
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 48607a29-a26a-4abf-8078-a06dbdd174a4
- Tagged by the source as
- CredentialAccess
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Sep 1, 2026
- Version
- 1