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Azure Storage Anonymous Blob Access to Unusual Resource

Identifies the first time an Azure Storage resource receives an anonymous data-plane read (GetBlob and related Get or List operations). Anonymous requests are used to probe public containers and to test stolen blob…

Description

Identifies the first time an Azure Storage resource receives an anonymous data-plane read (GetBlob and related Get or List operations). Anonymous requests are used to probe public containers and to test stolen blob URLs before a SAS is appended. First-seen resource ID keeps volume down while still covering WireServer-related probes of status or extension blobs.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
IaaSOffice SuiteSaaS

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Intentionally public containers (static websites, public datasets) generate anonymous GetBlob and ListBlobs. Baseline those storage accounts and exclude `azure.resource.id` after review.
  • Internet-wide scanners will produce first-seen anonymous access on newly created or newly logged accounts. Confirm whether the account is meant to be public.

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