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Microsoft Foundry High Request and Token Volume

Detects one caller IP sending a high number of requests and consuming a high number of tokens against the same Foundry deployment and operation during the rule lookback. That rate fits a script or a stolen key…

Description

Detects one caller IP sending a high number of requests and consuming a high number of tokens against the same Foundry deployment and operation during the rule lookback. That rate fits a script or a stolen key burning quota. The rule uses RequestResponse logs and does not need the prompt text. Tune the request count and token sum in the query.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersIaaSLinuxmacOSSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • Approved batch jobs, evaluation harnesses, and user-facing apps that fan out from one NAT. Exclude that caller IP prefix and deployment, or raise the thresholds to sit above the normal 9-minute peak.
  • Foundry masks the last octet of caller_ip_address, so unrelated users behind the same network prefix are counted together.

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