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AWS GetFederationToken Followed by Console Login via Federation Exchange

Detects the three-event chain produced by tools like aws_consoler that convert exfiltrated long-term IAM access keys into browser-accessible AWS console sessions: GetFederationToken obtains temporary credentials,…

Description

Detects the three-event chain produced by tools like aws_consoler that convert exfiltrated long-term IAM access keys into browser-accessible AWS console sessions: GetFederationToken obtains temporary credentials, GetSigninToken exchanges them for a federation sign-in token via the AWS federation endpoint, and ConsoleLogin confirms the resulting console session was opened — all from the same source IP within two minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence indicator of credential abuse using stolen IAM access keys.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

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Detection requirements

Platform
IaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Legacy federation broker applications that call GetFederationToken and immediately redirect users to a console session from the same host may trigger this rule. Validate the source IP against known application server infrastructure and confirm the federation architecture is documented.

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