AWS IAM Role Created with External Trust
Detects a successful AWS IAM CreateRole event whose trust policy allows sts:AssumeRole by a principal in another AWS account or by a wildcard principal. This configuration may provide persistent access if the…
Description
Detects a successful AWS IAM CreateRole event whose trust policy allows sts:AssumeRole by a principal in another AWS account or by a wildcard principal. This configuration may provide persistent access if the principal can assume the role. The event alone does not establish that the role was assumed or that its creation was unauthorized.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- aws_cloudtrail
Known benign triggers
- Approved cross-account integrations and deliberately configured wildcard trust may match. Review the role owner, trust-policy conditions, role permissions, and whether the principal is expected.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateRole.html | Only this detection cites it |
| stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/aws/aws.persistence.iam-backdoor-role/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 6b7f646b-5ddc-48c9-baa3-fd66ac202c18
- Tagged by the source as
- AWS IAM Privilege EscalationAWS AccountcloudSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securitythreat
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 19, 2026
- Version
- 1