Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack via macOS Security Events
Identifies a burst of failed inbound SSH authentication attempts on a macOS host followed shortly by a successful SSH authentication on the same host, using sshd authentication messages collected by the macOS…
Description
Identifies a burst of failed inbound SSH authentication attempts on a macOS host followed shortly by a successful SSH authentication on the same host, using sshd authentication messages collected by the macOS Security Events integration. A successful login immediately after repeated failures indicates that a password brute force or password spraying attack against an exposed SSH service has likely succeeded.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| themittenmac.com/detecting-ssh-activity-via-process-monitoring/ | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f5898b1e-3071-4597-b066-43d298c7b415
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: macOS Security EventsDomain: EndpointOS: macOSPlatform: macOSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 8, 2026
- Version
- 3