Potential Third-Party Cloud Storage Client Execution
Identifies execution of a third-party S3 or object-storage client (S3 Browser, s5cmd, s3cmd, MinIO mc, rclone, Cyberduck, s3fs, goofys, juicefs) launched by a script interpreter, a shell one-liner, or from a…
Description
Identifies execution of a third-party S3 or object-storage client (S3 Browser, s5cmd, s3cmd, MinIO mc, rclone, Cyberduck, s3fs, goofys, juicefs) launched by a script interpreter, a shell one-liner, or from a temporary or user-writable path. After stealing cloud credentials, adversaries switch from the AWS CLI to these clients to enumerate and drain buckets in bulk. Gating on a scripted context separates post-exploitation automation from interactive developer use.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Data engineers and DevOps teams legitimately use rclone, s5cmd, and s3cmd for bulk data transfers. This rule gates on a scripted parent to suppress interactive use, but automation pipelines that shell out to these tools may still trigger alerts. The 7-day new-terms window suppresses recurring invocations of the same client on the same host after the first alert. Allowlist known pipeline executor paths if additional tuning is needed.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.darklab.hk/2021/07/06/trouble-in-paradise/ | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/ramimac/aws-customer-security-incidents | 2 |
| unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/large-scale-cloud-extortion-operation/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- ab05c807-e12b-4ec1-8380-844a65c9fef1
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: CloudDomain: EndpointOS: LinuxOS: macOSOS: WindowsPlatform: AWSPlatform: LinuxPlatform: macOSPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsService: AWS S3Tactic: CollectionTactic: ExfiltrationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 29, 2026
- Version
- 1