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AWS Control Plane Access by Suspicious Process

Identifies a process running from a temporary or user-writable directory, or a script interpreter executing a payload from such a directory, followed by a network connection to an AWS identity, secrets, or management…

Description

Identifies a process running from a temporary or user-writable directory, or a script interpreter executing a payload from such a directory, followed by a network connection to an AWS identity, secrets, or management control plane endpoint. This detects credential abuse performed through an AWS SDK such as boto3, aws-sdk-js, or the Go SDK rather than through the aws command line binary. Rules that key on the CLI process name are bypassed entirely by SDK based tooling, which is what most post exploitation malware and supply chain stealers actually use, so this rule is intended as the name independent complement to them.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Build systems and CI runners frequently compile or download binaries into temporary directories and then make AWS API calls as part of integration tests. Exclude known runner paths and restrict to interactive or production hosts if alert volume is high.

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