Entra ID Deviceless Windows Hello Sign-in Followed by Device Registration
Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration by the same user within 15 minutes of a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) signing in with no…
Description
Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration by the same user within 15 minutes of a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) signing in with no device identifier. In the "borrowing Windows Hello keys" technique, an adversary reuses a WHfB/NGC key or passkey away from its bound device to mint device-agnostic tokens, then uses those tokens to register an attacker-controlled device and obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for long-lived persistence. Timing is taken from the authentication step on the sign-in, not the sign-in document timestamp, because Entra can emit the sign-in record after the Register device audit event. This chain is distinct from device-code-flow phishing kits.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- A user completing initial passwordless enrollment and registering their first device in the same session can match. Validate against expected onboarding and the device's provenance (managed/compliant, expected name, expected source).
- Authorized red team or research engagements that borrow a WHfB/passkey and register a device will match. Document the engagement and add scoped exceptions for the involved principals or source addresses.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| dirkjanm.io/borrowing-windows-hello-keys/ | 3 |
| dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/ | 10 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 62848597-595c-4cc3-8d24-6c47a5fee9a9
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit LogsData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityPlatform: Entra IDResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 2