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Entra ID Deviceless Windows Hello Sign-in Followed by Device Registration

Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration by the same user within 15 minutes of a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) signing in with no…

Description

Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration by the same user within 15 minutes of a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) signing in with no device identifier. In the "borrowing Windows Hello keys" technique, an adversary reuses a WHfB/NGC key or passkey away from its bound device to mint device-agnostic tokens, then uses those tokens to register an attacker-controlled device and obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for long-lived persistence. Timing is taken from the authentication step on the sign-in, not the sign-in document timestamp, because Entra can emit the sign-in record after the Register device audit event. This chain is distinct from device-code-flow phishing kits.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • A user completing initial passwordless enrollment and registering their first device in the same session can match. Validate against expected onboarding and the device's provenance (managed/compliant, expected name, expected source).
  • Authorized red team or research engagements that borrow a WHfB/passkey and register a device will match. Document the engagement and add scoped exceptions for the involved principals or source addresses.

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