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AWS Bedrock Model Invocation Impossible Travel

Detects the same AWS principal invoking Amazon Bedrock models (InvokeModel, Converse, and their streaming variants) from geographically distant source IPs within a short window at an impossible travel speed. Stolen…

Description

Detects the same AWS principal invoking Amazon Bedrock models (InvokeModel, Converse, and their streaming variants) from geographically distant source IPs within a short window at an impossible travel speed. Stolen access keys and session credentials are frequently resold or reused for LLMjacking, and an inference call from a second continent minutes after a legitimate one is a strong indicator that the credential is being used by someone else.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • Multi-region automation or CI pipelines that share one IAM user or role session across distant egress IPs. Prefer per-region identities, or raise the distance and speed thresholds.
  • VPN, proxy, or cloud egress that geolocates incorrectly or jumps between distant points of presence. Validate the IP locations and ASNs before rotating credentials.

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