Microsoft Foundry Keys or Connection Secrets Accessed by New Principal
Identifies the first time in seven days that a high-privilege Azure principal lists or regenerates the API keys of a Microsoft Foundry (Azure AI Services) account, or reads the stored secrets of a Foundry account or…
Description
Identifies the first time in seven days that a high-privilege Azure principal lists or regenerates the API keys of a Microsoft Foundry (Azure AI Services) account, or reads the stored secrets of a Foundry account or project connection. Account keys grant direct inference access to every model deployment on the account and bypass Entra ID conditional access, and connection secrets hold credentials for downstream services such as Azure OpenAI, storage, and search. A compromised identity retrieving these keys is a common first step in LLMjacking and in pivoting from a Foundry project to the data it is connected to.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Administrators with Owner or Contributor roles opening the Keys and Endpoint blade in the Azure portal or Foundry portal, which issues a listKeys call. Confirm the activity with the principal and prefer Entra ID authentication over key-based access.
- Infrastructure-as-code pipelines and deployment scripts that read keys to configure applications. Prefer managed identities, or add exceptions for the service principals that run these pipelines.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/how-to/connections-add | Only this detection cites it |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-services/authentication | Only this detection cites it |
| www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/azure/activitylogs | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 49796406-78a2-4c11-aa5b-6f1a3ca730de
- Tagged by the source as
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0055Data Source: AzureData Source: Azure Activity LogsData Source: Microsoft FoundryDomain: CloudDomain: GenAIPlatform: AzureResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessThreat: LLMjackingThreat: Unauthorized AI UsageUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 28, 2026
- Version
- 1