Azure AD Guest User Type Changed To Member
The following analytic detects when an Azure AD guest user account has its UserType property changed from Guest to Member. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update user" operation and compares…
Description
The following analytic detects when an Azure AD guest user account has its UserType property changed from Guest to Member. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update user" operation and compares the UserType modifiedProperty old and new values. A legacy account whose UserType was null is not a guest promotion and does not match. Guest accounts carry inherent restrictions on tenant resource access; elevating to Member removes those restrictions. If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an attacker is expanding the capabilities of a compromised or attacker-controlled guest account to gain broader access to tenant resources.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuitePRESaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- azure_active_directory_update_user
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate conversion of a guest account to a member account can occur when a contractor becomes a full-time employee or when an organization consolidates external identities. Validate the actor, target user, and whether a change management record exists for the conversion.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/ | 11from 2 sources |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions | Only this detection cites it |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/users-restrict-guest-permissions | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 487e9b86-49dc-48a9-bbb3-747df56b4db0
- Tagged by the source as
- Azure Active Directory PersistenceAzure Active Directory Privilege EscalationAzure Active DirectorycloudSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityidentity
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Nov 4, 2026
- Version
- 1