Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created
The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user"…
Description
The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" operation. TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor. If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuitePRESaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- azure_active_directory
Known benign triggers
- IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/ | 16from 2 sources |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/ | 7 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods | Only this detection cites it |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass | 2from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f820b423-7299-4bb6-9bf3-860bd475cddb
- Tagged by the source as
- Azure Active Directory Account TakeoverAzure Active Directory PersistenceAzure Active DirectorycloudSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityidentity
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Nov 4, 2026
- Version
- 1