Detection catalogue

#DONT_CORR# 'Identifies credentials harvested by infostealer malware on a compromised device. This exposure may indicate an actively compromised endpoint with associated command-and-control risk.'

#DONT_CORR# 'Identifies user accounts exposed with a plaintext password in a third-party data breach. Unremediated exposures of this kind can lead directly to account takeover.'

#DONT_CORR# 'Identifies exposure of identity access material such as session cookies, OAuth tokens, or SSO credentials. This material can grant direct account access without a password, so it bypasses password resets and single-factor controls. Revoking active sessions is the primary containment action.'

Identifies an illicit consent grant where a non-admin user consents to an application requesting high-risk delegated mailbox permissions (Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send or MailboxSettings.ReadWrite) together with offline_access. offline_access returns a long-lived refresh token, so a single successful end-user consent gives an attacker-controlled application durable, silent read/send access to the victim mailbox without re-prompting for MFA.

Identifies DNS queries to commonly abused Top Level Domains by common LOLBINs or executables running from world writable directories or unsigned binaries. This behavior matches on common malware C2 abusing less formal domain names.

Identifies HTTP requests to Azure WireServer (168.63.129.16) for GoalState, certificates, versions, or HostGAPlugin vmSettings that do not use a known guest-agent user agent. These requests retrieve transport certificates and extension protectedSettings, including embedded SAS URLs. Azure Linux Agent, Windows guest agent, and related platform UAs are excluded. Requests with no user agent are also excluded; that pattern is common for the Windows guest agent.

This rule monitors for the unusual occurrence of outbound network connections to suspicious webservice domains.

This rule detects when a web server process creates a file with a file extension that does not match the file content based on the file header bytes. This is a common technique used by attackers to bypass security measures and to hide the true nature of the file.

This rule detects when a web server process creates a file with high entropy, where the file extension is a web extension. This is a common indicator of an encrypted or encoded payload being uploaded.

This rule detects when a web server process creates a file with a double extension, where the real extension is a non-web extension. This is a common technique used by attackers to bypass security measures and to hide the true nature of the file.

Files that are placed in the "/etc/init.d/" directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator" can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the "/etc/init.d/" directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system.

Identifies OpenSSL generating a CN=LinuxTransport certificate or decrypting CMS/PKCS7 payloads with a key that is not the Azure Linux Agent certificate under /var/lib/waagent. Adversaries can scrape WireServer certificates, mint a LinuxTransport identity, and decrypt extension protectedSettings with openssl cms -decrypt or smime -decrypt.

Detects a burst of Microsoft 365 user account lockouts within a short 5-minute window. A high number of IdsLocked login errors across multiple user accounts may indicate brute-force attempts for the same users resulting in lockouts.

Identifies brute-force authentication activity targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts using failed sign-in patterns that match password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing behavior. Adversaries may attempt brute-force authentication with credentials obtained from previous breaches, leaks, marketplaces or guessable passwords.

Identifies the first time an Azure Storage resource receives an anonymous data-plane read (GetBlob and related Get or List operations). Anonymous requests are used to probe public containers and to test stolen blob URLs before a SAS is appended. First-seen resource ID keeps volume down while still covering WireServer-related probes of status or extension blobs.

Identifies a newly observed NetFlow, IPFIX, or sFlow exporter IP followed by another detection alert with medium-or-higher severity or an elevated risk score, where that exporter IP is the source of the detected activity in the same data stream namespace. This correlation adds behavioral evidence that can help distinguish routine exporter onboarding from a potentially unauthorized or compromised exporter introduced as part of defense evasion.

Identifies shells, LOLBins, GTFOBins, and scripting runtimes connecting to the Azure WireServer / HostGAPlugin address 168.63.129.16 on ports 80 or 32526. The guest agent uses this fabric endpoint for GoalState, certificates, and vmSettings. Adversaries with code execution on an Azure VM (including via Run Command) use curl, PowerShell, openssl, bun, or similar tools to enumerate versions, pull transport certificates, and read HostGAPlugin /vmSettings.

Identifies the first time, in a historical window, a host runs AzCopy copy or sync to Azure Blob, Data Lake, or File storage, or starts Azure Storage Explorer. These Microsoft utilities are legitimate data-transfer tools; ransomware and cloud-ransomware operators drop portable copies and use SAS-authenticated jobs to pull data from victim storage and push it to attacker-controlled accounts.

Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in some Windows DNS servers, resulting in Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a Denial of Service (DoS) from crashing the service.

This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of RPC traffic to the Internet. RPC is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control a system for maintenance or to use shared resources. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector.

This rule identifies a potential SYN-Based port scan. A SYN port scan is a technique employed by attackers to scan a target network for open ports by sending SYN packets to multiple ports and observing the response. Attackers use this method to identify potential entry points or services that may be vulnerable to exploitation, allowing them to launch targeted attacks or gain unauthorized access to the system or network, compromising its security and potentially leading to data breaches or

This rule identifies a potential port scan from an internal IP address. A port scan is a method utilized by attackers to systematically scan a target system for open ports, allowing them to identify available services and potential vulnerabilities. By mapping out the open ports, attackers can gather critical information to plan and execute targeted attacks, gaining unauthorized access, compromising security, and potentially leading to data breaches, unauthorized control, or further exploitation

This rule identifies outbound IPSEC NAT Traversal (NAT-T) traffic to an external destination IP that was not observed during the previous 5 days. IPSEC is a VPN technology that allows one system to talk to another using encrypted tunnels. NAT Traversal encapsulates IPSEC ESP traffic in UDP and, once a NAT device is detected, both peers float to UDP port 4500 for the tunnel data channel.

This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of Telnet traffic. Telnet is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control older or embedded systems using the command line shell. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. As a plain-text protocol, it may also expose usernames and passwords to anyone capable of observing the traffic.

Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration by the same user within 15 minutes of a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) signing in with no device identifier. In the "borrowing Windows Hello keys" technique, an adversary reuses a WHfB/NGC key or passkey away from its bound device to mint device-agnostic tokens, then uses those tokens to register an attacker-controlled device and obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for

Identifies the first-seen registration of a Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) credential for a Microsoft Entra ID user from a given source ASN in a tenant, based on a prefixed historic window. Enrollment is commonly part of legitimate onboarding or passwordless rollout and is not inherently malicious. Adversaries who have obtained a token that satisfies fresh (NGC) multi-factor authentication, for example by borrowing an existing WHfB key or passkey, can also enroll their own WHfB credential to

Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID sign-in that is satisfied by a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) while carrying no device identifier. Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) and passkey credentials are bound to a device's TPM, so a genuine sign-in with one of these methods is normally accompanied by the registered device it lives on. A WHfB or passkey assertion that authenticates with an empty `device_detail.

Detects a first-party FOCI tooling client (Azure CLI, PowerShell, VS Code, Graph CLI, Azure AD PowerShell, or Visual Studio) redeeming a device-bound Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for Microsoft Graph, SharePoint/OneDrive, or Exchange Online from a source IP that has not been seen with that deviceid. Replay events are limited to compliant or Intune-managed devices.

Detects a first-party FOCI tooling client (Azure CLI, PowerShell, VS Code, Graph CLI, Azure AD PowerShell, or Visual Studio) redeeming a device-bound Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for Microsoft Graph, SharePoint/OneDrive, or Exchange Online from an IP that is not among that user and device's Windows Sign-In or WAM addresses. Replay events are limited to compliant or Intune-managed devices: the stolen cookie keeps the workstation deviceid, so compliant-device Conditional Access can succeed off-box.