Potential Fileless Execution via O_TMPFILE
This rule identifies potential fileless ELF execution where a process is launched from an anonymous temporary executable path that appears as "/#<id>" in "process.executable". This pattern may be associated with…
Description
This rule identifies potential fileless ELF execution where a process is launched from an anonymous temporary executable path that appears as "/#<id>" in "process.executable". This pattern may be associated with "O_TMPFILE" and "execveat" with "AT_EMPTY_PATH", which can allow execution without a normal filesystem pathname.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/MatheuZSecurity/Dntry | Only this detection cites it |
| matheuzsecurity.github.io/hacking/fileless-loader-bypassing-elastic-memfd/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 6fdd522d-421c-49f5-884e-0f278c388276
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: SentinelOneDomain: EndpointOS: LinuxPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 12, 2026
- Version
- 1