Entra ID Register Device with Phishing Kit or ROADtools User Agent
Detects a successful Microsoft Entra ID Register device audit event for an Azure AD join or Azure AD register whose user agent is a Dsreg client string hardcoded by device-registration tooling. "Dsreg/10.0 (Windows…
Description
Detects a successful Microsoft Entra ID Register device audit event for an Azure AD join or Azure AD register whose user agent is a Dsreg client string hardcoded by device-registration tooling. "Dsreg/10.0 (Windows 10.0.19045.2006)" is the frozen user agent used by device code and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing-as-a-service kits such as Tycoon2FA and Kali365 when they register a device after capturing a victim session. "Dsreg/10.0 (Windows 10.0.19041.928)" is the default user agent used by ROADtools (roadtx) for Windows device registration. Adversaries register these devices to obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) and persist access that survives password resets and user-level session revocation.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- A legitimate, never-patched Windows 10 host at build `10.0.19041.928` (20H1) or `10.0.19045.2006` (22H2) can present the same Dsreg user agent during a genuine Azure AD join or register. Validate the device name, owner, and patch level against your device inventory before escalating.
- Authorized red team or penetration testing that uses ROADtools or phishing-kit infrastructure to register devices will match this rule. If this is expected, add exceptions for the specific user principal names, source IPs, or device names involved.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/token-bingo-dont-let-your-code-be-the-winner/ | 8 |
| dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools-token-exchange-roadtx/ | 4 |
| github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools | 17from 2 sources |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/concept-directory-join | 2 |
| unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/roadtools-cloud-attacks/ | 3 |
| www.huntress.com/blog/kali365-device-code-phishing-kit | 5 |
| www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260521 | 7 |
| www.volexity.com/blog/2025/04/22/phishing-for-codes-russian-threat-actors-target-microsoft-365-oauth-workflows/ | 20 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 63dc7e10-705c-41a3-8b2b-c5ae0c01399e
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityPlatform: Entra IDResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: PersistenceThreat: AiTM PhishingThreat: Device Code PhishingThreat: Kali365Threat: Tycoon2FAUse Case: Identity and Access AuditUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 20, 2026
- Version
- 1