Entra ID Application Self-Assigned to Privileged Role
Identifies an Entra ID application (service principal) assigning itself to a privileged directory role. An application typically does not promote itself, and a multi-tenant vendor application is even more uncommon.…
Description
Identifies an Entra ID application (service principal) assigning itself to a privileged directory role. An application typically does not promote itself, and a multi-tenant vendor application is even more uncommon. Any service principal self-assigning a privileged role should be investigated. Adversaries may compromise vendor application credentials and then escalate privileges to Exchange Administrator or Global Administrator, or subsequently add client secrets to other applications.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- Local automation or provisioning applications that are designed to assign roles to themselves. Review the owner and purpose, then exclude by application ID.
- Vendor onboarding or reconfiguration where a consented third-party management or backup application is deliberately granted a directory role by its own setup workflow. Confirm with the application owner and the change record, then exclude the specific application ID.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference | 2 |
| trustedsec.com/blog/managing-privileged-roles-in-microsoft-entra-id-a-pragmatic-approach | 2 |
| www.huntress.com/blog/vendor-credential-enables-unauthorized-access | 5 |
| www.todyl.com/blog/investigation-unauthorized-access-through-the-connectwise-cloud-backup-microsoft-365-app | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- a069c60c-06c5-4b73-be9d-9f2201e020d4
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityPlatform: Entra IDProfile: BetaResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Identity and Access AuditUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 20, 2026
- Version
- 1